Abstract -This paper reviews issues in application of the state corporate income tax to income from electronic commerce. After examining potential arguments for the tax (benefit principle, ability-to-pay, and entitlement) 
INTRODUCTION
T o date most discussion of state taxation of electronic com merce has focused on the sales and use tax.
1 There are, however, also interesting and important issues involving application of the state corporate income tax to income from electronic commerce.
1 See especially Hellerstein (1997) and NTA (1999) . For my contributions, see McLure (1997a McLure ( ), (1997c McLure ( ), (1998a McLure ( ), (1998b McLure ( ), (1999 McLure ( ), (2000a McLure ( ), and (2000b , which contain references to other literature. 2 One referee suggests: An answer to the question "Would a change in the way income is measured across political jurisdictions make things better?" requires (i) a social welfare function, (ii) an internally consistent set of assumptions regarding how economic actors behave, and (iii) a demonstration that given the behavioral assumptions, the change in income measurement rules would increase the posited social welfare function.
[T]his paper simply describes some institutional features of state corporate income taxation and asserts that things would be better using one rule instead of another, with no precise definition of what "better" means and with no model of firm behavior.
I find this assessment puzzling. I state explicitly (adding italics for emphasis in the revised version), "the objective should be to attribute income to the states where it originates." I do not see how that definition could be more precise. Since that is the objective-and there is no suggestion that the objective is to maximize social welfare-there is no need for a social welfare function or a model of firm behavior. 3 The paper draws heavily on McLure (1997a) and Hellerstein (1997) and literature cited therein. See Frieden (2000) for an excellent survey of the issues discussed here.
ers the basic structure of state corporate income taxes-the choice between separate reporting and formula apportionment, the role of unitary combination, and the choice of apportionment factors. The third and fourth sections discuss two key issues in implementation of corporate income taxes, nexus (jurisdiction to tax) and determination of the income to be taxed by a particular state that invokes nexus.
The last section provides concluding remarks.
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION FOR STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION
There is no good conceptual foundation for state taxation of corporate income. 4 The tax cannot be justified under either the benefit or the ability-to-pay principles of taxation. That having been said, since state corporate income taxes are not likely to go away, it is necessary to see what arguments can be marshaled for and against various ways of dividing corporate income among the states where a multistate corporation does business. 5 The answer, such as it is, can perhaps be found in the theory of entitlement. Whether or not that theory is accepted, it seems reasonable to say that the objective should be to attribute income to the states where it originates, not to the states of residence of corporations. 6 Source-based taxation is, however, likely to distort the location of economic activity, and it can be incredibly complicated. More fundamentally, it is, unfortunately, conceptually impossible to determine the geographic source of corporate income in many instances-a difficulty that electronic commerce is likely to aggravate. (To my way of thinking this is another reason that the corporation income tax is not a good state tax.) Strictly speaking, this means that the stated objective cannot be achieved. However, rules for nexus and the division of income should at least be mutually consistent.
Appraisal under the Benefit, Abilityto-Pay, and Entitlement Principles
Benefit Principle
The benefit principle attempts to charge recipients of public services for the cost of providing those services. Motor fuel taxes are perhaps the best example of a tax related roughly to benefits and costs of public services, in this case the benefits and costs of using streets, roads, and highways. For a number of reasons, the corporate income tax does not closely reflect benefits and costs of public services provided to corporations. First, benefits are not provided only to corporations; they are also provided to unincorporated businesses. 7 Second, benefits are not provided only to corporations that are 4 This does not, however, mean that the income tax should simply be eliminated, unless the objective is creation of a consumption-based direct tax. (Even then, one faces tricky design problems.) A comprehensive and consistent income tax would require integration of the corporate and individual income taxes. On the integration of state income taxes, see McLure (1981b) . 5 For a more detailed exposition of some of the themes of this section, see McLure (1975) . 6 Having often been reminded that the U. S. Constitution requires less-that tax be "rationally related" to activities in the state is all that is required-I resist the temptation to say that the most rational relationship of all is attribution of income to the state where it originates. I merely note that my assumed purpose is to determine the source of income, constitutional tests notwithstanding. There is no doubt that my purpose is consistent with constitutional norms, even if it is not compelled by them. 7 This argument would have no force if the corporate and individual income taxes were completely integrated, as the former tax would function only as a withholding device. Since the two state income taxes are totally separate, corporate-source income is subject to greater taxation (at least if it is distributed) than is income earned in a proprietorship or a partnership, the income from which simply flows through to the individual taxpayer.
profitable. Third, benefits are not related to profitability.
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Ability-to-Pay Principle
The common interpretation of the ability-to-pay principle is that individual taxpayers with income below a given threshold should pay no tax and that the percentage of income paid in tax should rise systematically as income rises. The corporate income tax also fails this test.
9 First, the corporate-source income of shareholders whose income lies below the tax threshold is subject to corporate income tax. Second, under a "classical" (unintegrated) system of income taxation, in which the corporate and individual taxes are separate, the additional tax resulting from imposition of the corporate income tax falls, as a percentage of income, as income rises.
Entitlement
Peggy Musgrave (1984) has suggested that jurisdictions where income originates are entitled to revenues from taxes on such income. Perhaps most compelling in the case of economic rents earned in the exploitation of natural resources, the entitlement theory appears to have force in all cases where there is exploitation of the economy of a state or nation to earn extraordinary profits. Indeed, since taxable corporate income includes the normal return to equity capital, entitlement may not be limited to extraordinary profits. Under this view jurisdictions where income originates (source jurisdictions) are entitled to tax corporate income. 10 The third and fourth sections consider the problem of isolating the income that originates within various jurisdictions.
Appraisal of Residence and SourceBased Taxation
In the international sphere residence countries accord to source countries priority in the taxation of corporate income earned by multinational corporations, exercising only a residual right to revenue not taken by the source country.
11 Residence countries use two techniques to accord priority to source countries, exemption of foreign-source income and credits for foreign taxes levied on income earned abroad.
This two-tiered system would make no sense in the context of state income taxes, since the state of residence is essentially meaningless and subject to manipulation.
12 Basing residence on the place of incorporation, as is the practice of the federal government in the international sphere, would not work, since all corporations could easily be incorporated in notax states. Competition among states to be chosen for corporate residence would result in a "race to the bottom" in setting tax rates and assure that revenues from the tax would be small or non-existent.
13
8 The view that the ability to earn profits justifies taxation of corporate profits under the benefit principle reflects misinterpretation of that principle, which cannot be used to justify taxation that exceeds the cost of providing benefits. See, however, the discussion of entitlement below. 9 The view that the corporate income tax is consistent with the ability-to-pay principle because it adds to the progressivity of the tax system reflects a misunderstanding of the principle, as well as ignoring the fact that the excess tax resulting from the corporate tax, as a percentage of income, declines as income rises. See McLure (1975) . 10 For a recent application of this reasoning in the international sphere, see McLure (2000c) . 11 The statement in the text pertains only to income from direct investment. Under the OECD Model Treaty, on which most extant tax treaties are based, residence countries have priority in taxing income from portfolio investment. Slemrod (1995) provides a useful description of these arrangements. For a survey of the history of this arrangement, see Graetz and O'Hear (1997) . 12 For further development of this theme, see McLure (1983) and (1986) . 13 To the extent that one believes there is no justification for a state corporation income tax, this result is not all bad. But see note 4 above.
Place of effective management, the test used in much of the rest of the world, could also easily be chosen to minimize taxes.
14 More fundamentally, residence has little to recommend it as the basis for state taxation of corporation income. To the extent that either the benefit principle (already discredited above) or entitlement justifies state taxation of corporate income, it is source-based taxation that is justified. Even if a case could be made for state taxation based on the ability-to-pay principle, it would be states of residence of shareholders that should levy the tax, not the state of residence of the legal entity. In short, corporate residence is such an artificial construct in the state tax field that residence-based taxation of corporate income makes no sense. 15 The task, thenand the topic of the remainder of this paper-is implementation of source-based taxation of corporate income.
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Distortion of the Location of Economic Activity
Individual income taxes levied by the state of residence are less likely to distort the location of economic activity than are individual income taxes levied by the state where income originates, unless the latter are closely related to benefits of public services provided to the taxpayer-which I think unlikely, as a general proposition.
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Similarly, unless closely related to benefits of public services provided to corporations-a proposition I have claimed above not to hold-a source-based corporate income tax is likely to distort the location of economic activity. (By comparison, a residence-based tax on corporate income would only distort the location of residence, likely to be an artificial construct, especially if based on place of incorporation.)
While the charge that a tax distorts the location of economic activity may trouble economists and policymakers accustomed to thinking like economists, it is not likely to alarm most state lawmakers. However, creating an unfavorable business climate in the taxing state, which is one aspect of the problem, may cause concern.
Complexity
Taxation of corporate income is inherently complicated. However, state corporate income taxes are far more complicated than they need to be, in large part because there is no "system." Despite the existence of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) and the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), whose stated objectives include the fostering of greater uniformity in state taxes, there are significant differences across states, inter alia, in such matters as nexus rules; the definition of apportionable income (reduced by the tendency to rely on the federal rules); combination of activities of related corporations; and the choice, definition, and measurement of factors in apportionment formulas.
18 (Terms and statements that may not be clear are ex-14 For a discussion of manipulation of the place of effective management in the international sphere, see AviYonah (1997) . 15 But, similar to practice in the international area, non-business income (what is commonly called portfolio income in the international sphere), which seems to have no obvious geographic source, is generally attributed to the state of commercial domicile (e.g., the state of residence, by some definitions); see Hellerstein (1993) . 16 See McLure (1986) for further discussion of the case for source-based taxation. 17 In this regard, indirect taxes (e.g., sales taxes and excises) levied by the state where consumption occurs are like residence-based income taxes and indirect taxes levied by the state where production occurs are like source-based income taxes. 18 Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted by all 50 states, fewer than half the states have adopted UDITPA, many of them with significant modifications. plained below.) In addition to the standard concern for costs of compliance and administration, a particular concern is central to the present discussion-the risk that complexity will create an unreasonable burden on interstate trade under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAXES
To make valid policy choices in the taxation of income from electronic commerce, it is necessary to understand the basic structure of state corporation income taxes.
19 This section discusses the choice between geographic separate accounting and formula apportionment as techniques for determining the geographic source of income, the difference between separate reporting and unitary combination in handling the activities of groups of corporations, and the choice of factors to use in the apportionment formula.
Separate Accounting vs. Formula Apportionment
It is difficult to determine accurately the income a corporation earns in a particular state. 20 First, corporations generally do not engage in geographic separate accounting-accounting for income on a state-by-state basis; they account for income earned throughout the nation, without regard to geographic source. Second, because of economic interdependence between parts of a corporation operating in different states, it may be conceptually impossible to use geographic separate accounting to isolate the income attributable to each state. Third, corporations could manipulate transfer prices to shift income to low-tax states, if they did employ geographic separate accounting. For these reasons states have long employed formula apportionment to divide the income of multistate corporations among the states where they operate.
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Separate Reporting and Unitary Combination
Separate reporting by each corporation may also fail to isolate the income of affiliated firms engaged in a unitary business because of economic interdependence and the possibility of manipulating transfer prices 22 (see . Even so, many states allow or require affiliated firms to employ separate reporting to determine the income of individual corporations, which is then apportioned among states using the state's standard formula.
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By comparison, some states require or allow corporations subject to their jurisdiction to file combined reports where related corporations are deemed to be engaged in a unitary business. In a combined re- 19 For an excellent introductory description of state practice, see Frieden (2000) , chapter 3 and 4. For more complete descriptions and analysis, see Hellerstein and Hellerstein (1998) . 20 McLure and Weiner (2000) discuss the suitability of formula apportionment for use in the international context within the European Union. 21 Weiner (1994) reviews the development of state corporate income taxes. For a discussion of the early development of the use of unitary combination, see Miller (1984) . 22 I thank Walter Hellerstein for insisting on the useful distinction between geographic separate accounting and corporate separate reporting, which often is not observed. The former attempts to use accounts specific to particular jurisdictions to isolate the income arising in those jurisdictions; formula apportionment would have no role in such a system. The latter accounts for the income of each legally separate entity and uses a formula to apportion income of corporations operating in multiple jurisdictions. In the international sphere the two concepts often merge and are confused, because separate corporations are commonly employed to do business in each country, except in particular industries; McLure and Weiner (2000) fail to make this distinction clearly. 23 Frieden (2000), p. 222 reports that two-thirds of states imposing corporate income taxes employ separate reporting, rather than unitary combination.
port the activities of corporations deemed to be engaged in a unitary business are combined, transactions between members of the unitary group (including financial flows) are eliminated, and the apportionment factors of the combined group are used to determine the portion of the income of the entire group that the state will tax. 24 Whereas some states once attempted to apply unitary combination on a worldwide basis, virtually all now limit unitary combination to the water 's edge.
It is worthwhile to note that the practical implication (or is it merely the theoretical implication?) of employing an apportionment formula is to convert what is ostensibly a tax on income into a tax on the state's share of whatever happens to appear in the apportionment formula, levied at a rate that depends on the overall (nationwide) profitability of the corporation, relative to the various apportionment factors (and, of course, the statutory tax rate).
25 It would be substantially more direct and more honest simply to levy a tax on the economic activities that appear in the apportionment formula.
26 State corporate income taxes probably continue to be levied in large part because of the mistaken impression that their burden falls on corporate profits, instead of having the incidence of taxes on the apportionment factors-incidence that is much more likely to be on local residents, especially in their capacity as employees and consumers.
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The Choice of Apportionment Formula Apportionment formulas consist of the weighted average of the fractions of selected economic activities of a corporation that occur in the taxing state. The key questions in choosing a formula are which economic activities, commonly called apportionment factors, the formula should contain and the relative weights to be accorded each factor. As with many issues discussed in this paper, there are no easy answers to these questions.
At one time apportionment formulas differed widely across states and included a large number of factors. 28 More recently, formulas have included a standard list of at most three factors: payroll, property, and sales (attributed to the state of destination), and for many years virtually all states employed a standard formula that gave equal weight to these three factors. In recent years there has been a decided shift toward placing greater weight, or even exclusive weight, on sales. 29 24 A combined report is to be distinguished from a consolidated return. Under federal tax law the income of commonly-owned corporations would ordinarily be included in a single consolidated return for the group, without regard to the existence of a unitary business. Also, unitary combination is used to determine the income attributable to corporations having nexus in the taxing jurisdiction, not to tax the income of the group, as such. 25 See McLure (1980) . It should be noted that the distortions of the location of economic activity are those of a tax on the factors in the apportionment formula, not those of a tax on income actually earned in the taxing state; see also McLure and Weiner (2000) . 26 In McLure (1980) I call the tax "lambs in wolves' clothing" to emphasize that a corporate income tax levied by a single state has incidence that resembles that of taxes on payroll and sales (the lambs)-and, of course, a tax on property, rather than that of a tax levied on corporate profits originating in the state (the wolf). See also McLure (1981a) . 27 I argue in McLure (1986) that one of the few valid arguments for the state corporate income tax is to "backstop" the state individual income tax, that is, to prevent use of the corporate form to avoid paying individual income tax. Even this argument is suspect, as the state individual income taxes are residence-based and the state corporate income taxes are source-based. It would probably be more sensible to rely on the federal corporate income tax to backstop both the state and federal individual income taxes and eliminate state corporate income taxes. 28 See Weiner (1994) for a historical review of experience in this area. 29 See Weiner (1996) , Duncan (1996), and Frieden (2000) .
To be consistent with the conceptual discussion of the second section, the formula used to apportion income among states should reflect the geographic source of income. Side-stepping the question of whether payroll, property, and sales are the appropriate factors, by assuming that they are, we must ask what is the proper weight to place on each and whether sales should be attributed to the state of origin or to the state of destination. I do not examine how the payroll and property factors should be measured.
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Peggy Musgrave (1984) has argued that if one wants a "supply-based" apportionment of income, only the payroll and property factors are appropriate. (There is probably little reason for the formula to include sales at origin, which are likely to be highly correlated with payroll and property, and therefore redundant. It also seems to be easier to manipulate the sales factor.) But, Musgrave notes, if one wants a "supply-demand-based" apportionment, sales at destination should be included in the formula.
To some extent this debate takes on overtones that are virtually theological. My own inclination is to include sales at destination in the formula. This reflects the belief that the ability to exploit a market is a source of income and of entitlement to tax.
It seems unlikely that the shift to placing greater weight on sales in apportionment formulas reflects an epiphany in which state lawmakers have come to believe that the contribution sales make to profitability has been understated by the traditional formula. 31 More likely it reflects realization that use of the two origin-based factors (payroll and property) is likely to discourage economic activity in the state more than use of sales at destination.
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IMPLEMENTING SOURCE-BASED TAXATION, I: NEXUS Two issues generally arise in the attempt to implement source-based taxation of corporate income: a) whether a potential taxpayer has nexus in the taxing state, and b) determination of income to be taxed by individual states where nexus exists. This section considers the first of these and the next section considers the second.
In discussing nexus, I proceed in three stages, first describing existing nexus rules, then asking what nexus rules would make sense, and finally evaluating whether the existing rules are sensible.
Nexus under Current Law
Under current law there are two potential limits on the nexus rules adopted by the states (aside from state constitutions and decisions of state courts), federal legislation and decisions of the federal judiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court, on the constitutionality of state taxes.
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The U.S. Congress has provided statutory 30 It probably makes sense to include sales to business (and to government), as well as sales to households, in the sales factor, since the objective is to apportion corporate profits to the states where profits originate, even though this introduces an element of cascading into the sales-related portion of the corporate income tax. See also note 31. 31 The original logic behind inclusion of sales at destination in the apportionment formula was not accurate sourcing of income: it was a political choice-to give market states that lacked industry a share of corporate tax revenue. See Hellerstein (1993) and Weiner (1996) . 32 Note, however, that the sales-related portion of the corporate income tax imposes an origin-based burden on business, to the extent it is related to sales to business, even though sales are assigned to the state of destination. Only if the sales factor were to exclude all sales to business would the sales-related portion of the tax have no negative impact on economic activity in the taxing state. 33 For a detailed discussion of nexus rules and issues, most of it related to sales and use tax, see Frieden (2000) The issue in Geoffrey was whether an outof-state firm (Geoffrey) that licenses trademarks to a company operating in South Carolina (Toys 'R' Us), but has no physical presence there, has nexus for income tax in that state. In concluding that nexus did exist, the South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned a) that Geoffrey had nexus under the Due Process Clause because it had purposefully directed its activity to the South Carolina market, b) that, since this is not a sales and use tax case, the physical presence test of Quill did not apply, and c) that the licensing of intangible assets for use in South Carolina and derivation of income therefrom provided the "substantial nexus" that is required under the Commerce Clause. Since the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, it is unclear how the Court would have 34 The use tax is levied on in-state purchasers of goods shipped from out-of-state (remote sales) to compensate for the fact that a state cannot constitutionally impose its sales tax on such transactions, which occur outside the state. 
Sensible Nexus Rules
In establishing nexus rules that make sense it seems appropriate to focus on two considerations: accurate reflection of where income originates and avoidance of undue burdens of compliance and administration. Excessive compliance burdens should always be a matter of concern in framing tax policy, but in the state tax context there is another consideration; compliance burdens may be crucial to a determination of whether a nexus rule will pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause.
Reflecting the source of income. Potential taxpayers should not be found to have nexus where they are not engaged in significant amounts of activities that would create tax liability for a firm that does have nexus; conversely, they should be found to have nexus where they do engage in significant amounts of those activities. Failure to follow these principles could cause a finding of nexus where there would be little or no tax liability and failure to find nexus where a corporation with nexus would have a significant tax liability. Thus, in determining nexus for income tax, it is appropriate to ask whether the potential taxpayer conducts significant 37 See Frieden (2000 ), pp. 335-8, Hellerstein (1994 , and references in McLure (1997a), p. 336, n. 237. 38 See also Frieden (2000), chapter 6. 39 On the effectiveness of "entity isolation," see McIntyre (1997) . 40 There is another important distinction between nexus for income tax and nexus for use tax. In the former case the out-of-state vendor is potentially the taxpayer; in the latter it is potentially merely the agent of the state, collecting tax that is due from its customer. amounts of whatever economic activity would give rise to income tax liability in the state if conducted by a profitable taxpayer-that is, whether the taxpayer conducts significant amounts of the economic activities that are factors in the state's apportionment formula (e.g., payroll, property, and sales). 41 Ideally, if (and only if) the result of the inquiry is positive, the potential taxpayer would be found to have nexus.
Burdens of compliance (and administration) . Some might be tempted to interpret the previous discussion of entitlement to imply that nexus under the Due Process Clause would imply nexus under the Commerce Clause. That would be a mistake. That a corporation avails itself of the opportunity to exploit the resources or market of a state (and thus has the "minimum connection" required for nexus under the Due Process Clause) does not imply automatically that the state should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction to impose income tax on the corporation. The repetition of the words "significant amounts" in the previous paragraph is intended to prevent a finding of nexus where the economic activities of the corporation that could create nexus are de minimis. De minimis rules are required both to prevent subjecting taxpayers to the burden of compliance (and to avoid waste of government administrative resources) in cases where the amount of revenue at stake could not possibly justify the expense 42 and to prevent compliance burdens that impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Thus more should be demanded than the "minimal connection" required for nexus under the Due Process Clause.
It would not be satisfactory merely to specify in general terms that "significant amounts" of in-state payroll, property, or sales would be required for nexus; that leaves too much uncertainty and too much room for litigation. 43 There should be quantitative bright-line tests based on the minimum amounts of each factor needed to establish nexus.
Further comments. Reference to "physical presence" is notably missing from the previous two paragraphs. If one were relying on the benefit principle to justify the state corporate income tax, a physical presence test of nexus might be justified on the grounds that the receipt of benefits requires a physical presence. I find this argument more compelling in a world of tangible products and services that require physical presence for their delivery than in a world of intangible products and services that can be delivered over the Internet. 44 Protection of intellectual property is of paramount importance in the 41 In the sales tax context, we would ask whether the potential taxpayer makes significant amounts of sales in the state. In making this judgment it would be appropriate to take a common-sense view, asking whether purchasers in the state buy from the potential taxpayer, and not be hung up on legal distinctions such as sales versus use taxes and where title passes. If the legal distinctions must be observed, then we can focus on the use tax, instead of the sales tax. It is interesting to note that this distinction does not arise in the case of the sales factor in the income tax, since sales at destination are being used only to apportion income; sales are not, per se, subject to tax. To an economist this distinction seems ludicrous, especially since an apportioned income tax can be decomposed into taxes on the apportionment factors. 42 It is totally unreasonable to require calculation and payment of income tax where the revenue at stake is not considerably more than the cost of compliance and administration. It is not enough, as some seem to believe, that revenue merely exceed the cost of compliance and administration. After all, compliance and administration involve real costs, whereas taxation is simply a zero-sum transfer of funds between the taxpayer and the government. (In making this statement I ignore the excess burden of taxation. While the excess burden of raising a given amount of revenue is not independent of the taxes used, a discussion of this issue would take us far afield.) The use of resources for compliance and administration only makes sense if the amount to be transferred is great enough. 43 On the ambiguity created by generally worded de minimis rules, see Frieden (2000) , pp. 272-89. 44 I make this argument in the international setting in McLure (2000c). latter case, whether or not the owner of the property has a physical presence in the state. But, as noted earlier, I do not believe that the benefit principle provides a firm foundation for the state corporation income tax. (The public cost of protecting intellectual property is far less than the revenue from the state corporation income tax. Besides, it is largely a federal activity.)
A physical presence test of nexus is even less appropriate if the state corporate income tax is based on entitlement. Under this view, the question is simply where income originates; the existence of a physical presence in the taxing state is essentially irrelevant.
The nexus test proposed here is not based on the much maligned test of "economic presence," which the states have tried (without success in the sales tax area) to substitute for a test of physical presence. Nor is it based on the presence of intangible assets, as is "Geoffrey nexus." Rather it is based on the common-sense notion that nexus exists where (and only where) significant amounts of the (apportioned) tax base exists or could exist (that is, if the firm is profitable, as well as having apportionment factors in the state)-in other words, where the corporation has significant amounts of the economic activities that are factors in the apportionment formula.
To emphasize the attractiveness of the proposed test of nexus based on apportionment factors, it may be worthwhile to describe a set of income measurement rules and nexus rules that are mutually inconsistent. Suppose that nexus requires the presence of payroll or property in the taxing state and that the only factor in the apportionment formula is sales.
45 A corporation that has all its payroll and property in one state and all its sales in another would owe income tax in neither; it would not have nexus in the market state and it would have not have sales in the state where it has nexus. This extreme example shows the absurdity of divorcing income measurement and nexus rules. It is essential that the two rules be consistent. Consistency can most naturally be achieved if nexus rules are based on the apportionment factors, which are, in turn, chosen to reflect the source of income. Basing nexus rules on the existence of apportionment factors in the state makes the proper choice, definition, and measurement of apportionment factors especially important. The last section discusses these issues.
Appraisal of Nexus under Current Law
Basic appraisal. Current rules for determining income tax nexus fail miserably. P.L. 86-272 has ben justified as needed to limit extra-territorial taxation and interference with interstate commerce, but it has no conceptual foundation. Instead it reflects the exercise of raw political power and prevents the assertion of nexus by states that should be able to collect income tax from corporations deriving income from within their boundaries. While assertion of Geoffrey nexus may produce defensible results, it also lacks conceptual foundation, and reliance on it creates uncertainty and encourages litigation.
By comparison, the proposed rules are conceptually sound; thus they would prevent both extraterritorial taxation and unjustified tax avoidance. De minimis rules would prevent costs of compliance from being an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Because both the basic nexus standards and de minimis rules would be clear, there would be little uncertainty and litigation.
If there is a weakness in the approach proposed here (aside from the political difficulty of getting it adopted), it lies in the choice, definition, and measurement of apportionment factors. I turn shortly to the discussion of apportionment factors.
Discrimination in P.L. 86-272 and Geoffrey. On the face of it, both P.L. 86-272 and the physical presence test of nexus for duty to collect use tax discriminate in favor of out-of-state sellers of tangible products, relative to both in-state sellers of tangible products and all sellers of intangible products. 46 If successful, assertion of Geoffrey nexus against out-of-state sellers of tangible products would avoid discrimination vis-a-vis in-state corporations selling similar products, but could place all sellers of intangible products at a competitive disadvantage, relative to out-of-state sellers of tangible products that can arrange their affairs to avoid nexus. And, of course, the difference in the tax treatment of tangibles and intangibles for the purpose of determining nexus would create distinctions between products that serve similar or identical purposes. Besides creating undesirable economic distortions, such artificial distinctions would cause uncertainly and encourage litigation.
Further thoughts on nexus: the relationship to unitary combination. While unitary combination is no panacea, in many instances it would reduce the pressure on the question of nexus. Geoffrey illustrates this. Since South Carolina law does not allow unitary combination, the state could not tax royalties Toys "R" Us paid to Geoffrey without asserting Geoffrey nexus. 47 (Toys "R" Us deducted the royalties in calculating its apportionable taxable income.) Had South Carolina law provided for unitary combination, Geoffrey would never have arisen. Suppose that, as was never disputed, that Geoffrey and Toys "R" Us (and perhaps other corporate affiliates) were engaged in a unitary business. Apportionable income of the unitary group would have included an amount equal to the excluded royalties. While the result would not have been identical under unitary combination to what they were under the decision in Geoffrey, tax liability would certainly have been greater than under separate reporting without successful assertion of nexus over Geoffrey.
IMPLEMENTING SOURCE-BASED TAXATION, II: ISOLATING INCOME EARNED IN THE TAXING STATE
Once the nexus issue is settled, determination of the income attributable to a given state depends on two things: a) the success with which separate reporting isolates the income of corporate entities (in the absence of unitary combination) or the unitary group (if the state allows or requires unitary combination) and b) the choice, definition, and measurement of the apportionment factors used to divide the income of each entity or unitary group. 46 The situation may not be as clear as it seems at first glance. Income allocation under the income tax can, to some extent, be seen as a zero-sum game, in that income not apportioned to one state may be apportioned to another. To prevent the existence of "nowhere income," sales that the standard destination-based sales factor would otherwise attribute to a state that lacks jurisdiction to tax, about half of the states subject such sales to a "throwback rule" that attributes it to the state of origin of the sales; see Frieden (2000, p. 224) . By comparison, sales to a state that lacks jurisdiction to require collection of use tax are likely to go untaxed, since states of origin of such sales generally do not exercise their clear constitutional right to tax the sales. Thus there is generally substantially greater incentive to avoid nexus under the use tax than there is under the income tax.
(The truth of this statement depends, inter alia, on the relative level of income taxes in the states of origin and destination of sales and the apportionment formulas employed by the two states, as well as use tax rates and whether the destination state has a throwback rule. It may also depend on the ability to use separate corporate entities to isolate activities in states where they will not be subject to tax, and thus on whether the states combine the activities of firms deemed to be engaged in a unitary business.) Of course, if the state of origin has no income tax, the income in question would go untaxed. 47 Actually this is somewhat of an overstatement, as royalties deducted by Toys "R" Us might have been adjusted.
Problems of Separate Reporting in the Digital World
As noted earlier, because of economic interdependence and the possibility of manipulating transfer prices, separate reporting may fail to isolate the income of legally separate entities, especially if they are engaged in a unitary business. 48 The advent and growth of electronic commerce are likely to aggravate these difficulties. The difficulties of isolating the income of corporations doing business in the United States from the income of foreign affiliates, be they subsidiaries, parents, or sister corporations, are especially daunting. 49 Since worldwide unitary combination is essentially a thing of the past, 50 the states must rely on the U.S. Internal Revenue Service to protect their interests, by monitoring international transfer pricing.
Problems of separate reporting are not, of course, limited to international transactions; if they were, states would not need to allow or require unitary combination. States are not well-equipped to handle these problems, which in the international sphere are among the most complicated in all of tax practice. This paper is not the place to consider these complications, which have been discussed at length in the international literature. Rather, I simply quote two assessments of the prospects for continued reliance on separate reporting and arm's length pricing in the international area. In 1990 Ronald Pearlman, then Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress and former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, said, "it is beyond my comprehension that section 482 is going to be administrable in the long run. . . . I just don't see how arm's length principles are going to be a viable way of apportioning income internationally. . . . "
51 Vito Tanzi, head of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund has expressed similar views:
The arm's length criterion for establishing acceptable transfer prices has often proved ambiguous or not very helpful. It may not be too far-fetched to predict that in a technologically evolving world, the allocation of income by the use of transfer prices may be subject to increasing challenges and may thus become progressively more controversial. Other allocation principles based on formulas may acquire more legitimacy than now.
52
It is worth noting a) that both these statements were made before the advent of electronic commerce and b) that states are vastly less prepared to undertake the same type of analysis of transactions between 48 Geoffrey illustrates the problem of using separate reporting to isolate the income of Geoffrey and of Toys 'R'
Us. Both economic interdependence and the possibility of manipulating transfer prices to shift income (and the incentive to do so) clearly exist. 49 See, for example, U.S. Treasury (1996), Horner and Owens (1996) , Avi-Yonah (1997) , McLure (1997a) , and Doernberg and Hinnekens (1999) and literature cited there. 50 Note, however, that the European Union has recently shown interest in using formula apportionment to divide the income of corporations operating in more than one member nation. This is ironic, given the strong opposition some of its members showed to the use of unitary combination by American states during the 1980s. But much of that opposition was to worldwide combination; it is generally assumed that the EU would limit combination to the "water's edge" of the Union. 51 Pearlman, 1990, p. 284 . Section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code specifies arms length tests for transfer prices. 52 Tanzi, 1995, p. 139 . Note, by comparison, the view of key personnel of the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, Horner and Owens (1996) , who suggest that electronic commerce will not require a change in the fundamental principles governing taxation of international income flows. By comparison, the U.S. Treasury Department (1996) has suggested that the challenge to traditional source-based taxation may be great enough to justify a shift to greater reliance on residence-based taxation. Avi-Yonah (1997) expresses a view, which I share, that is contrary to both these positions.
domestic firms. Thus it seems essential for more states to adopt unitary combination if they are to deal satisfactorily with the problems of isolating the income of related entities in the digital age. (The problem has existed in the pre-digital age; it is merely aggravated by the advent of ecommerce.)
The Definition and Measurement of Apportionment Factors
As noted earlier, formulas used to apportion income among the states commonly include three apportionment factors: payroll, property, and sales. The last two of these do not function well in the digital world of intangible assets and intangible products and services downloaded from the Internet. As Frieden has noted, there are several sources of the problems: the rules were crafted during the 1950s, when intangible assets and intangible products and services were much less important than now and federal regulation prevented the provision of many services by firms operating in more than one state. Beyond that, the states did not adopt the provisions as initially recommended in UDITPA. Finally, and most important, electronic commerce did not exist. (See Frieden, 2000, pp. 226-9.) The Sales Factor Essentially all states follow UDITPA in assigning sales of tangible property to the state of destination.
53 By comparison, other receipts, including sales of intangible property and services, are assigned to the state where income-producing activity occurs, as measured by the cost of performance. Whereas some states follow UDITPA in assigning sales on an all-ornothing basis to the state with the greatest income-producing activity, some allocate sales among the states in proportion to the costs of performance incurred in each, and others break totally with UDITPA and assign sales to the state of destination. In principle, "income-producing activity" is defined quite narrowly to refer to individual transactions; in this it parallels the treatment of sales of tangible products.
This "system" is badly flawed. 54 First, UDITPA's origin-based treatment of sales of intangibles and services is totally inconsistent with the destination-based treatment of sales of tangible products. The inconsistency causes both compliance/ administrative and economic problems: pressure on the distinction between tangible products and intangible products and services and discrimination between vendors of equivalent (or similar) products delivered in conventional form (e.g., shrink-wrapped software) and over the Internet (downloaded software).
The origin-based treatment of sales of intangibles also accentuates incentives to locate production activities, and thus costs of performance, in no-tax (or low-tax) states.
55 Whereas these incentives may often be overcome by other considerations in the case of manufacturing and mining (e.g., the need to locate near natural resources, transportation nodes, or markets), there may be few counteracting forces in the case of the relatively footloose activities that characterize much of 53 For more exhaustive discussion of the topic of this section, see Frieden, 2000 , pp. 210-29. Hellerstein (1993 is an encyclopedic discussion of the state income tax treatment of income from intangibles. McLure (1997b) discusses the possibility of employing the state system for the taxation of intangibles in the international context. 54 I do not bother to mention the obvious inconsistency between the three methods states use to source sales described in the text: all-or-nothing to the state with the greatest cost of performance, among states in proportion to costs in each, and to market states. While important, this probably pales beside the basic inconsistency inherent in the states' assignment of different weights to the various apportionment factors. 55 Note that increasing the weight on sales to attract economic activities would not have the intended effect for a state that does not attribute sales of intangibles and services to market states.
e-commerce. 56 Thus there could be a "race to the bottom" that effectively eliminates tax on income from sales of intangibles.
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The alternative would be multilateral adoption of destination-based sourcing rules for sales of intangibles and services.
Second, states provide little guidance on how to determine where costs of performance occur.
58 Taxpayers need to know, for example, which of the following costs of developing and selling software are included: research and development, marketing, maintenance of servers, technical support, home office expenses, etc. 59 The laws of many states and MTC regulations say that only direct costs are to be considered and that the calculation of these costs is to be based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); but there is no GAAP for determining direct costs of services.
Substitution of a destination-based source rule for sales of intangibles and services would go a long way toward solving the problems identified here. The distinction between types of products would be irrelevant, there would be no discrimination based on the method of distributing equivalent products, the adverse effects on location of economic activities would be reduced, and it would not be necessary to determine where costs of performance occur. 60 A destinationbased sourcing rule would have the added advantage of being consistent with the destination-based treatment of sales under the sales and use tax. This is not to say that a destinationbased system would involve no problems.
61 It is often difficult to know the destination of products that can be delivered over the Internet, and many such products may be used in multiple locations. Even if one relies on customers to provide this information, it may be necessary to invoke what Hellerstein calls a "throw-around" rule to allocate otherwise unallocable sale in proportion to allocable sales. 62 This would be preferable to use of the standard throwback rule, which would suffer from problems similar to those involved in the cost of performance rule. 56 Thus Frieden (2000), pp. 211-12, notes:
... businesses selling tangible property over the Internet will typically have more flexibility to locate their factors of production, such as property and payroll, in different jurisdictions so as to minimize state income taxes. ... [T] he Internet is accelerating the trend toward 'hollow' corporations with more narrowly defined core competencies. With E-commerce there is less need for companies to be vertically integrated. ... With the narrowing of core competencies, Internet businesses will frequently have the flexibility to relocate (or initially locate) their property and payroll in jurisdictions with more favorable income tax rules and rates. 57 Again, to the extent that one believes there is no justification for a state corporation income tax, this result is not all bad. 58 Frieden, 2000, p. 221, notes, "[T] axpayers are left in most jurisdictions with ambiguity both as to how Ecommerce activities are to be characterized (tangible or intangible property) for state income tax purposes and as to how such activities are to be sourced for sales-factor purposes . . ." 59 This origin-based source rule is substantially simpler than a destination-based rule for small taxpayers whose production is concentrated in one or a few states but whose customers are in far more states. But that would be equally true of the use of an origin-based system for sales of tangible products. 60 Commenting on "the frequent impracticality of using these income-producing activity and cost-of-performance sourcing rules," in the case of canned software, Frieden, 2000, p. 218-9, says, "If the jurisdiction used a market-state rule, instead of a cost-of-performance rule, these issues would never arise, as the only relevant inquiry would be determining the location where the customer uses the canned software." 61 Frieden, 2000, p. 246, notes correctly that under current law a state employing a destination-based sourcing rule for sales of intangible products may not have the nexus required to impose income tax. If nexus reflected apportionment factors, as suggested earlier would be appropriate, this problem would not arise. 62 See Hellerstein (1997) . Note that in the income tax field there is no equivalent to direct pay, the practice whereby business customers remit use tax on purchases from remote vendors. The legal liability for income tax is on the seller, not the buyer, as under the use tax.
The Property Factor
Under UDITPA only tangible property is included in the property factor. This seems quite unsatisfactory, since tangible property may be a small minority of the assets of a firm engaged in electronic commerce; the "crown jewels" are intangible assets.
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Frieden (2000, p. 241) notes, ". . . the rise of E-commerce may lead to a reexamination of the role of the property factor in corporate apportionment formulas," and suggests that one alternative would be to add intangible property to the apportionment formula. Yet it is often impossible to attribute intangible assets to a particular location with precision. Where the value of intangible property reflects a normal return on the input of labor and capital, it might be sensible to calculate the value of that property by capitalizing costs of inputs and attribute it to the various states. But where, as is the current situation in electronic commerce, the value of inputs seems to have little relation to the value of intangible assets, this approach is less attractive. Another alternative would be to eliminate the property factor, as a few states have already done by using only sales to apportion income. But that is an extreme response. In short, there is no good answer to this problem.
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Because of the inability to treat intangible assets satisfactorily, an e-commerce firm could find it profitable to locate tangible assets (and payrolls) in no-tax (or low-tax) states for the sole (or primary) purpose of reducing the amount of tax attributable to states that tax income. In McLure (1980) I showed that a state corporate income tax that is based on formula apportionment can usefully be decomposed into a set of taxes on the factors in the apportionment formula. Tax liability related to the property factor can be expressed as the product a) the nominal tax rate multiplied by the weight accorded the property factor, b) the ratio of apportionable income to the corporations' total tangible property (the denominator of the property factor), and c) tangible property located in the taxing state (the numerator of the property factor).
Consider the choice between locating tangible property in a state that has an income tax and one that does not. In algebraic terms, if the taxing state assigns equal weight to payroll, property, and sales, the corporate income tax effectively levied on property in that state would be:
[1] L t = (t n /3) (Π/T) T t , where:
L t is the corporate income tax effectively levied on property in the taxing state, t n is the nominal tax rate, Π is total apportionable income, T is total tangible assets, and T t is tangible assets hypothetically located in the taxing state.
If the state corporate tax rate is 9 percent and the rate of return on tangible assets is 10 percent, equation [1] can be written as:
[1′] L t = (0.09/3) (0.1) T t = (0.003) T t .
This implies that the after-tax rate of return on tangible assets located in the taxing state would be reduced to 8.7 percent, or by 3 1/3 percent.
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63 This discussion focuses on intangible assets that are particularly important for electronic commerce, such as intellectual property, not on those such as loans secured by mortgages and other financial assets. Frieden (2000), pp. 230-4 discusses the latter. 64 An origin-based measure of sales might be a reasonable surrogate for payroll and property, including intangible property. If so, it might be reasonable to consider an apportionment formula that contains two elements: sales at origin and sales at destination. 65 For convenience I ignore the effects of federal income tax, including the deductibility of the state tax, which would reduce the rate of return and ameliorate the effects described here.
Suppose now that the corporation has intangible assets, as well as tangible assets. The counterpart to equation [1] is:
[1a] L t = (t n /3) (Π/A) (A/T) T t , where:
A is the total value of tangible and intangible assets.
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Suppose now that tangible assets comprise only 10 percent of the total assets of the firm.
67 Equation [1a] can be written as:
[1a′] L t = (0.09/3) (0.1) 10 T t , = (0.03) T t .
In this case the after-tax rate of return on tangible assets located in the taxing state would be reduced to 6 percent, or by onethird. In short, in this case, for a given return on total (tangible and intangible) assets, the corporate income tax attributed to tangible assets in the taxing state will be 10 times as large as in the situation where all the firm's assets are tangible assets. That is, the incentive to locate tangible assets in no-tax states is 10 times as great as in the latter case.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Like the state sales and use tax, the state corporate income tax is a product of history. While both taxes reflect some effort to create sensible systems, both "just growed" in response to a variety of influences: political exercise of state fiscal sovereignty, some of it arguably misguided; administrative discretion by revenue departments, often generated by pressure to increase tax collections based on existing laws, so politicians would not be forced to increase tax rates; judicial decisions, including those of the U.S. Supreme Court, etc. There are many inconsistencies across states, as well as provisions in the laws of individual states that do not make sense. The result is complexity, uncertainly, and distortion of economic decisions. The growth of electronic commerce is likely to aggravate all of these problems.
The purpose of this paper is to describe basic problems with the state corporate income tax that the advent of electronic commerce is likely to aggravate and to suggest some ways the system could be modified to achieve the assumed objective: taxation of income that originates in particular states. This objective is so obvious that its implications may be overlooked. These include the conceptual foundation for sensible nexus rules, which must be qualified by the important concern for compliance burdens and burdens on interstate commerce. The basic objective should also condition two choices: the choice between separate reporting and unitary combination and the choice, definition, and measurement of apportionment factors. Unlike the situation under current law, nexus rules and apportionment rules should be intimately related.
At the end of the day, there are two enormous problems in applying the corporate income tax to the digital world, where intangible assets, intangible products, and services are vastly more important than in the world for which existing rules for nexus and division of income were crafted: the difficulty of including "crown jewel" intangibles in the property factor and the difficulty of implementing destination-based sourcing of sales.
